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The lawyer has unquestionably become the hero of the Supreme
Court's drive to improve criminal justice. The path from Gideon' to
Massiah2 to Escobedo3 to Miranda4 has brought the lawyer, as an all
but indispensable appurtenance, from the courtroom to post-indict-
ment investigations to post-arrest interrogations. Last term, in United
States v. Wade,5 the Court held that a suspect has a right to counsel at
his lineup and, consequently, that testimony describing an out-of-court
identification elicited in the absence of counsel must be excluded
unless the suspect expressly waived his right.6 An in-court identifica-
tion made without reference to a prior unconstitutional lineup is also
inadmissible unless the prosecutor can somehow show that the in-
court identification was the product of the witness' independent recol-
lection.7
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
3. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
6. The holding flew in the face of one circuit judge's assertion that right to counsel
at a lineup was a "'Disneyland' contention," advanced by appointed counsel to avoid
later attacks on the competency of his representation. Williams v. United States, 345
F.2d 733, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion). There were two companion cases.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court decided that the Wade rule was not
retroactive; but it approved another ground for a constitutional attack on a lineup
procedure, citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). In Palmer, the Fourth
Circuit had held that a patently unreliable identification technique in a Virginia case
violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. In Palmer, the victim of a rape
"identified" the accused solely on the basis of hearing his voice from an adjoining room.
Moreover, the sheriff had somehow managed to testify that "I didn't waiit her to see
him," id. at 202, although this may have sounded sillier than it was-the rapist had
worn a "purina chow bag" over his head. In reversing, the court said that a state may
not rely "on an identification secured by a process in which the search for truth is made
secondary to the quest for a conviction." Id. In Stovall, however, the Supreme Court
decided against the petitioner's due process claim on the facts. The suggestion implicit
in the showup in a victim's hospital room was not sufficiently outrageous when balanced
by the fact that the victim, the sole eyewitness to her husband's murder, could not be
moved to a less suggestive setting, and her life was in doubt.
In the other companion to Wade, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1067), the Court
applied Wade to vacate a conviction; it also decided, inter alia, that a suspect (toes not
have a right to counsel when he is told to produce a sample of his handwriting. Id. at
267.
7. In so holding, the Court adopted a test first endorsed in the fourth and fifth
amendment context of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963): "[Tjhe more apt
question . ., is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence
to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that Illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)." Id. at 488. Accordingly, both Wade and Gilbert
were returned to the trial courts for a hearing on the issue of "taint."
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The problem to which the Court responded is clear enough., It
has long been thought that inaccurate eyewitness identifications are
the principal cause of erroneous convictions.0 Edwin Borchard's well-
known book, Convicting the Innocent, discusses 65 cases where inno-
cent men served prison terms; 29 were the victims of faulty eyewitness
identifications. Borchard's first case dramatizes the problem better
than any theoretical discussion of perceptual psychology: 17 victims
of a bogus-check artist wrongly identified an innocent man, under
oath. The real con man, when apprehended, turned out to look
nothing at all like the innocent man who had been convicted.' 0 It
also appeared that the police had suppressed the fact that other vic-
tims of the same scheme had stated that the suspect was not the
criminal."
And statistical compilations must understate the problem. Cases of
known erroneous identifications come to light only after the appre-
hension-and usually the confession-of the real culprit. Yet in spite
of the dangers recognized by all in the often casual and at least occa-
sionally contrived ways in which most identifications are elicited, 2-
no legislatures have dealt seriously with the problem. The few courts
which have excluded evidence of pretrial identifications have usually
eschewed a straight, hard look at the reliability of the testimony and
relied instead upon the intricacies of the hearsay rule'r--for example,
when a policeman describes a prior lineup identification by an un-
available witness. Under the conventional wisdom, reliability goes only
to the weight to be given the evidence, and not to its admissibility.14
8. See generally the materials cited by the Wade Court, 388 US. at 228 n.6, 229 n.7.
9. M. Homrs, FRo M EIDENCE TO PROOF 10-11 (1956); ef. J. F.ANrn & B. FRANK, Nor
GtrrTY 31 (1957).
10. Of Borchard's 29 instances of erroneous identification, only two involved look-
alikes, and in twelve of them the accused was identified by four or more witnesses.
11. E. BoRcaRnn, CONVICrING THE INNoCENT 1-6 (1932).
12. One English critic has charged that the pretrial identification in his country is
often "a subtle campaign of suggestion." The Case Against Personal Identification, 13
FORTNcnrLY L.J. 87 (1943); Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority in McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948), said, "[H]istory shows that the police acting
on their own cannot be trusted."
13. E.g., Wilson v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 134, 11 S.A.2d 803 (1928); cf. Poole v. United
States, 97 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1938). Contra, DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1925); 4 J. wIGMORE, EVMIENcE § 1130 (3d ed. 1940). See also Annor., 71 A.L.IR.d 449 (1960).
14. E.g., Golliher v. United States, 362 F.2d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 1966). But see Proctor
v. State, 223 Md. 394, 164 A.2d 708 (1960). Other cases tend to permit introduction of
evidence of a pretrial identification even when the witness is unable to identify the
suspect at the trial. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 196); People v.
Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960), noted in 8 U.C.L.A.L. PM.
467 (1961); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 586 Pa. 149, 125 A.2d 442 (1956).
The strictures of the hearsay rule have been abrogated by statute, too. N.Y. CoDz
Cira PRoc. § 393(b) (1958).
At the same time, it should be noted that few courts will sustain a conviction on
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Unsatisfied by this lack of legislative and judicial response to the
problem, the Supreme Court seized once again upon the lawyer as a
solution. '5 This newest assignment for the bar, however, relies upon
extrajudicial identification alone. See People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 631, 354 P.2d
865, 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1960); Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 530, 532 (1952). But see
State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 144 N.W. 142 (1913).
15. The problem of pretrial identification has not been left unsolved for want of study
and simple, cheaply implemented safeguards. One proposal would require that a suspect
be picked from a group at a lineup and not, as is often done, presented alone (and
handcuffed) to the victim of a crime; that a witness not be shown a mugshot unless it Is
inconspicuously included in a large group of similar photographs; that the witness be
given no information concerning the suspect, such as his arrest record; and that Identifica.
tions be made with no other witnesses present. It would also require, as a prercqtlsite
to the admissibility of identification testimony, that the witness had not failed to
identify the suspect at any prior time. Comment, Possible Procedural Safeguards Against
Mistaken Identification by Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 552 (1955). For a similar
proposal, cited by the Court in Wade, 388 U.S. at 236 n.26, see Murray, The Criminal
Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 610, 627-28.
Another commentator has suggested that witnesses be required to furnish police with a
signed description of a criminal before they are allowed to identify anyone. Marshall,
Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 197,
229 (1963). Such a requirement, however, would serve to impeach many correct Identifica-
tions. One critic of eyewitnesses refers (without citation) to a study of 20,000 cases
revealing that descriptions of criminals by eyewitnesses overestimate height by an average
of five inches, age by eight years, and are wrong about hair color 82 per cent of tile
time. The Case Against Personal Identification, 13 FORTNIGHTLY L.J. 87 (198). See also
P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 10-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as WALL]. It would seem that the sense of recognition aroused by a suspect In the
flesh is more reliable than a description. But empirical study is needed.
Without resort to the legislature-or a written constitution-English courts have
developed substantial restrictions on police conduct of "identification parades." Evidence
of a pretrial identification is excluded if the police pointed out the suspect at the lineup.
R. v. Chapman, 7 Crim. App. 53 (1911); cf. Redmon v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1959). It is also excluded if, before the lineup, police showed the witness photographs
of a suspect already in custody, R. v. Goss, 17 Crim. App. 196 (1923), R. v. Haslam, 19
Crim. App. 59 (1925); or if, though the suspect was not yet in custody, they showed the
witness only one photograph. See R. V. Melany, 18 Grim. App. 2 (1924). And in some
circumstances, a lineup may be de rigueur. R. v. Smith & Evans, 1 Crim, App. 203 (1908);
R. v. Williams, 8 Crim. App. 84 (1912). In Australia, omission of a cautionary Instruction
on the danger of suspicious identification evidence constitutes reversible error. Davies &
Cody v. R., 57 Commw. L.R. 170 (Austl. 1937). For a discussion of the English and
Australian cases, see Paul, Identification of Accused Persons, 12 AUsTL. L.J. 42 (1938).
Finally, either courts or legislatures could act to prohibit convictions based solely
on eyewitness identification, a suggestion made in G. WILuAMS, PROOF or GUILT 113
(3d. ed. 1963). No American rule of common law or statute requires corroboration of
eyewitness identification. WALL 184. Indeed, such a rule is opposed by Wigmore, 7 5.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2033 (3d ed. 1940), on the grounds that the rule is too rigid, cf. C.
McCoRMiCK, EVIDENCE 230 n.5 (1954). But Wall would hpprove such a rule where tile
evidence was "suggestively obtained"-by which he intends to encompass all single.
suspect showups. WALL 190. It seems that Wall's approach could be tempered by an
exception for cases wherein the witness had had much more than a fleeting glimpse of
the criminal-a kidnap case, for instance. See Mr. Justice White's partial dissent in
Wade, 388 U.S. at 251. In any event, some cases on the books provide Wall with effective
ammunition. Notably dramatic are People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963);
People v. Cashin, 259 N.Y. 434, 182 N.E. 74 (1932). See also Commonwealth v. Kloiber,
378 Pa. 412, 424, 106 A.2d 820, 826 (1954): "[A] positive, unqualified identification of tile
defendant by one witness is sufficient for conviction even though half a dozen witnesses
testify to an alibi." Indeed, the defendant in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled
by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1962), mustered a number of alibi witnesses
but was convicted by the court after he had been identified at a showup displaying most
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a different rationale than other recent Sixth Amendment cases. As a
consequence, the precise role the lawyer is to play at lineups is not
immediately clear, nor does the Court make it so. There is, moreover,
reason to question how effectively the lawyer can perform any of the
several tasks expected of him.
I. "Critical Stages" and Counsel
The cornerstone of the Court's decision in Wade was the now
familiar concept of the "critical stage."' 0 By this analysis the right to
counsel must arise "at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal,
in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the accused's
right to a fair trial." 17 A pretrial identification, the Court found, was
such a stage because it was "peculiarly riddled with innumerable
dangers and variable factors .... "18 This being so, "the first line of
defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the
hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup itself."' 0 Since
counsel might, the Court concluded, serve to prevent unfairness, a
criminal suspect had the right to such assistance.
Couched in language of such syllogistic simplicity, the decision
superficially seems no more than a logically demanded extension of
the Court's recent work. But a trial may be "unfair" in several ways.
In Hamilton v. Alabama,20 for example, the unfairness arose when the
state denied the accused assistance of counsel at a formal pretrial pro-
ceeding. And in Escobedo and Miranda, it arose when the state pro-
ceeded to seek a confession: in the absence of advice of counsel, an
accused's privilege to remain silent was inadequately protected.
This reasoning cannot apply to the lineup, however, for there it
does not appear that counsel is included to protect any legal rights of
the accused. Mr. Justice Brennan held for the Court that "[n]either
the lineup itself nor anything.., that Wade was required to do in the
lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination."2' Rather than
of the known relevant sins. This aspect of the case is treated thoroughly by Kamisar,
The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: a Dialogue on "'The Most
Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 42-56 (1962).
16. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 US. 59
(1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 878 U.S. 478 (1964).
17. 388 U.S. at 226.
18. Id. at 228.
19. Id. at 235.
20. 268 U.S. 52 (1961).
21. 288 U.S. at 221. At the same time, it may be that the interests served by Miranda
will also be served by Wade. For as Mr. Justice White pointed out in his Miranda
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protection of the self-incrimination privilege, the holding of the Court
in Wade was concerned with the reliability of the fact-finding process.
Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan distinguished the denial of a right to coun-
sel at the time -of a blood test on the grounds that there "the tech-
niques of science and technology" 22 are sufficiently precise and well-
known to allow effective challenge by the accused at trial. In lineups,
on the other hand, the reliability of the identification can be affected
by "innumerable dangers and variable factors" which the Brennan
opinion paraded in careful detail.
Perhaps the most startling aspect of this new rationale for the
"critical stage" analysis is its sweep. If any stage where the reliability
of the fact-finding process is endangered is critical, should not counsel
be required whenever his presence in the investigative process would
reduce the danger of unreliable evidence?
The risk of an erroneous identification is certainly at least as great,
for example, where the police apprehend a suspect close after the
crime and in the same vicinity, and bring him before the still trem.
bling victim; Wade would presumably apply. In Kennedy v. United
States23 the police arrived at the scene of a robbery in response to a
radio call and found two men forcibly detaining Kennedy in the alley.
Hearing a woman screaming inside the house where the robbery had
occurred, the police took Kennedy in tow and entered. Inside, they
found the victim handcuffed to the bannister. She identified Kennedy
immediately. In such circumstances the victim's recollection may well
be fresher than at a subsequent lineup or trial; but the victim is even
more susceptible to suggestion by the police, intended or not ("Isn't
this the man?"). On the other hand, it may be argued that the suspect
should not be denied the opportunity to be exonerated on the spot.
And, by the same token, the police as a practical matter must be given
some way to decide whether to settle for the suspect apprehended or
search on. The practical difference between lineups and the Kennedy
situation is the ease with which lawyers can be made available; unfor-
dissent, it seems odd that confessions elicted without warning are per se Involuntary,
while waivers of the Tight to counsel will not be. 384 U.S. at 536. By injecting counsel
into the process prior to interrogation, the danger of involuntary waivers should be
lessened. So should be the danger of the phony lineup mentioned by the Miranda
majority, where a number of "eyewitnesses" feign recognition of the suspect, implicating
him in crimes other than the one under investigation. To escape the false accusations of
other crimes, he may confess. 384 U.S. at 453.
22. 388 U.S. at 227.
23. 353 F.2d 462 (1965).
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tunately, this critical factor never appears in the rhetoric of the "critical
stage" analysis.
Moreover, although Brennan speaks of the "innumerable dangers"
inherent in a confrontation between the accused and the %ictim, a
risk of reliability at least as great can arise when the accused is not
even personally involved. What if the police show the victim a mug-
shot of the suspect? If he is an Oriental and everyone else in the scrap-
book is not?2
4
The Court did appear to seek a limiting rationale for the "critical
stage" analysis that would key determinations of the need for counsel
to whether a lawyer lacking such firsthand knowledge could effectively
cross-examine the Government witnesses at trial.2 This may offer a
valid means to distinguish investigatory techniques which can be ad-
ministered impartially to yield objective results from those which in-
variably include subjective evaluations and consequently a risk of
undetectable error at trial. But the risk of error is only one factor
determining the reliability of evidence; the risk of abuse in applying
an investigatory technique must also be considered. In fact, most of
the horribles paraded by the majority in Wade involved the latter.-0
And on this score, it is unclear why a lawyer can better expose a rigged
blood test by cross-examination at trial than he can a rigged lineup.;1
The cases must, therefore, be distinguished by some difference in the
risk of undetectable abuse, and not merely-as in the Court's opinion
-by the difference in the risk of good-faith error.
But criticism of the Court for failing to set or even suggest reasoned
limits to the broad sweep of the "critical stage" analysis may be unfair
where the Court is concerned with reliability. Having concluded as
it obviously did in Wade that the problems of reliability in lineups
24. For an exhaustive discussion of identification by photograph, see WA.L, Ch. V.
25. See 388 U.S. at 227-28.
26. Id. at 232-34.
27. We have no evidence for the Court's assertion that cross-examination of lineup
witnesses will fail to convey at trial an accurate idea of what occurred at the lineup.
Moreover, the accused himself is present at a lineup, and there is no reason to doubt
that in most cases he will see and be able to relate to his counsel substantially all that
occurred. That which the police prevent the accused from seeing (e.g., a pecp-hole
identification), they can also prevent his counsel from seeing. The Court may, of course,
be concealing its unarticulated fear that even an accurate picture of what occurred at
the lineup will not dispel from the jurors' minds the force of a subsequent courtroom
identification. But if concern over the impressionability of jurors is the basis for the
Court's decision, one may legitimately query whether the confusion induced by the
cure is any better than the disease. Courtroom identifications based on unreliable pretrial
investigations are reduced, at the expense of a total obfuscation of the boundaries of the
right to counsel and the concept of a "critical stage."
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justified intervention, the Court could perhaps with propriety leave
to another day and the concrete circumstances of another case the
task of distinguishing other obvious areas of possible unreliability.
The absence of any satisfying indication in Wade of what role
counsel should or can play at lineups is more disturbing, however. To
the extent that lawyers cannot correct the abuses of lineups, the solu-
tion chosen by the Court becomes suspect. The obvious alternative
was to lay down detailed rules for the conduct of lineups, similar to
those established for interrogations in Miranda. Since such a decision
would have the immediate attractions of creating predictability and
consequently reducing the Court's likely caseload, the necessary ques-
tion is why lawyers can either better eliminate the problems of unre-
liable identifications at lineups or aid the Court toward an ultimate
solution.
II. Lawyers at Lineups
The Wade opinion is silent concerning what the lawyer should do
at the lineup-it says only that he may prevent unfairness. But how?
May he forbid the police to conduct a particular type of pretrial
identification? If the self-incrimination privilege does not extend to
lineups, the law-yer can claim no authority from that constitutional
source. And until the Supreme Court establishes standards for uncon-
stitutional unreliability, he cannot cite any explicit prohibitions to
the police. In the absence of any defined rights of the accused to pro-
tect, the role of the lawyer in any traditional sense seems limited. To
the extent the accused is a passive participant at this stage of the
process, with neither rights to assert nor tactical decisions concerning
his defense to make, the accustomed role of the lawyer as counsellor,
guide and spokesman is irrelevant. Of course, the lawyer can attempt
to haggle with the police over what would be "fair," or what a court is
likely to consider "fair." But there is nothing in the Brennan opinion
to suggest that the police are obligated to reciprocate in haggling
sessions. To the extent that they are, the door is open for obstruc-
tionist techniques. As Mr. Justice White's dissent pointed out, the
attorney's duty to his client is not limited to an intellectually honest
quest for truth;28 traditionally, even the guilty are entitled to the
assistance of counsel. Whether such assistance should extend to ob-
structionist efforts in the stationhouse is a nice question; as a practical
28. 388 U.S. at 256-57.
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matter, it is a possibility of which the Wade majority gave no indica-
tion it was even aware.
Nor did the majority consider what the consequences should be for
improper obstructionist efforts by an attorney on behalf of his client.
To take an obvious example, the Court held in Wade that a voice
identification test at the lineup does not violate the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination. Presumably, then, the accused has an obli-
gation to participate. What consequences should follow if his lawyer
advises him to stay completely silent? Can the lawyer be punished for
contempt if he persists after a court order to advise his client to
answer? What if his client has by then realized that perhaps staying
silent is a good tactic, even if his counsel changes his advice under
court encouragement? Are consequences for the defendant at trial
proper, such as either a presumption that the witness would have
identified his voice, or an instruction for the jury to draw whatever
inferences seem proper under the circumstances? In the former case,
the penalty may seem too harsh; in the latter case, the guilty accused
may have nothing to lose by his refusal to speak, particularly if his
attorney can mount some plausible argument to the jury why a voice
test would have been unreliable.
To the extent that an affirmative, adversary role for the attorney is
envisaged at the lineup, the Wade decision thus may create more
problems than it solves. But there are suggestions in the opinion that
perhaps the majority's image of the lawyer's role is simply that of a
witness, aware of the legal implications of that which he witnesses.-
Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan referred more than once to the need for
an attorney with firsthand knowledge of what went on at the lineup
to assure "a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at
trial ... ."30
However, this conception of the lawyer's role at the lineup does not
solve all the difficulties. Whether the lawyer at the lineup is participant
or observer, there remains the possibility that prejudicial techniques
may not be the prime cause of erroneous identifications-it may be
that the mode of identification pales in significance when compared
with other factors, such as the lighting at the scene of the crime or
the vindictiveness of the witness, which the lawyer at a lineup can
29. Should this be so, the Wade rule becomes conceptually indistinguishable from
traditional exclusionary rules of evidence-for example, the rule that wills must be
witnessed to be admitted to probate.
30. 588 US. at 227-28.
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hardly "witness." If faulty identifications do result primarily from
factors beyond the control of the police, the Wade Court has simply
made law enforcement more difficult without attacking the principal
cause of unreliability. Second, and perhaps more important, to the
extent the police may abuse the process there is reason to question how
often a lawyer-witness will catch them at it. A lineup may be rigged
more subtly than by placing a Negro suspect on a stage with five white
men. How, for example, will a lawyer know from watching the lineup
whether a witness has been coached? Or shown a mugshot of the sus-
pect? How can he prevent the use of peep-holes or one-way mirrors to
permit the witness to look at the suspect before the lineup? For such
abuses, cross-examination will remain his only source of information,
as it was before Wade.31
Finally, if a witness at the lineup is wanted, why choose a lawyer?
This indeed is the common center of all the preceding criticism. An
impartial court observer could perform the passive function of a wit-
ness fully as well as a lawyer, while creating none of the problems an
active lawyer attempting to play an adversary role may create.3 2 Or
the Court could have required that if a lawyer is not present, a record
of the lineup-films, tape recordings, etc.-be made available to him
in a form which would convey essentially the information a witness
at the lineup could collect.33
III. Lawyers at Lineups: The Strategic View
Even with full allowance made for the faith and hope which move
Supreme Court justices as well as lesser men, the Wade majority could
not reasonably expect lawyers to eliminate the unreliability of lineup
31. In an "Oklahoma Showup," the police ensure that the witness confronts the
suspect prior to the lineup in some apparently inadvertent manner. When the lineup
takes place, the witness will be apt to identify the suspect, since he will recognize him
and assume that his recognition results from his encounter with the criminal. See M.
MACHLIN & W. WOODFIELD, NINTH LIFE 56-57 (1961); WALL 48; cf. People V. Clark, 28
Ill. 2d 423, 192 N.E.2d 851 (1963). The danger to the suspect is seemingly beyond the
protection afforded by Wade.
32. Indeed, the Court pointed out in a footnote that "(a]lthough the right to counsel
usually means a right to the suspect's own counsel, provision for substitute counsel may
be justified on the ground that the substitute counsel's presence may eliminate the
hazards which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence of the suspect's own
counsel." 888 U.S. at 237 n.27. The thought seems paradoxical, however, if the right to
counsel is predicated on the need for firsthand information to ensure effective cross-
examination. It may be that the Court simply wishes to subject the police investlgation
to the impartial scrutiny of an astute observer not connected with the prosecution.
33. The idea was suggested prior to Wade, in Murray, The Criminal Lineup at
Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAir L. Ruv. 610, 628, and was mentioned by tile Court, 388
U.S. at 236 n.26.
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identifications. Simple rules for the conduct of lineups might have
been far more effective at the cost of a far smaller burden on the
system. But the Court's lack of experience in this area, plus the rigidity
of detailed rules cast as constitutional requirements, provided a strong
argument for a more tentative approach.
By creating a new right to counsel but emphasizing that the re-
quirement depends upon the continued categorization of the line-up
as a "critical stage," the Court could immediately attack the worst
abuses while retaining maximum long-run flexibility. The Court's
explicit invitation for legislative action to "eliminate the risks of abuse
and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings" 4 and thereby
"remove the basis for regarding this stage as 'critical' "3 laid the
groundwork for a graceful withdrawal from the field if such legislation
materializes. Alternatively, the Court may have good reason to hope
for a more affirmative police response to lineup restrictions than to
the interrogation restrictions culminating with Miranda. A natural
desire to convict the guilty allows the police to rationalize interroga-
tion techniques that, while violative of the self-incrimination privilege,
are nevertheless likely to produce reliable confessions. But with line-
ups, the police can never be sure that attempts to elicit identifications
result in conviction of the guilty person.
Yet, whether or not legislative intervention or police "self-improve-
ment" comes to pass, the lineup issue will have been kept before the
Court as the newly-required lawyers challenge the reliability of various
procedures. This continuing supervision of the lineup process can
benefit the Court in several ways. Most obviously, if further inter-
vention to assure lineup reliability is necessary, the Court will be
better qualified than it was in June to establish constitutional rules
for the conduct of lineups. Secondly, because Stovall v. Denno,30 a
companion case to Wade, announced no test to determine when un-
reliability, in lineups or elsewhere, reaches constitutional dimensions,
challenges to the reliability of other aspects of police investigation are
inevitable. The Court is presently ill-equipped to deal with reliability:
as an issue of constitutional dimensions, reliability has been before the
Court only in what might be called a "shock the conscience" context,37
34. 388 U.S. at 239.
35. Id.
36. 388 U.S. 293 (1967), discussed in note 6 supra.
37. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where eidence obtained by pumping
a suspect's stomach was held inadmissible: the method of gathering it "shocked the
conscience" of the Court. Id. at 172.
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where no evidence at all appears in the record,88 or where other im-
portant issues were obviously lurking-as in the coerced confession
cases where the self-incrimination issue finally surfaced. The tactical
use of a right to counsel permits the Court to act deliberately in block-
ing out the boundaries of a constitutional problem ultimately more
closely related to the procedural integrity of the system embodied in
the concept of due process of law than to the protection of the human
dignity of individual defendants. Although jailing an innocent man
may be the worst affront to human dignity we are capable of adminis.
tering, the affront consists in his imprisonment, and not in indignities
inflicted upon him while obtaining factually unimpeachable evidence
to send him there. It would be a fool's errand to attempt to chalk the
limits to which the Court will permit the impeachment of evidence
gathered by unreliable techniques before anyone-justices, lawyers or
academicians-has any clear notions of how and when unreliability
reaches intolerable proportions. The presence of lawyers at lineups
will focus professional attention on the prickly issues raised by
attempts to evaluate the reliability of investigatory technique.8 9
A third possibility, however, must be considered. There is precedent
in the Court's history for the conversion of what is ostensibly a reli-
ability issue into a self-incrimination issue: the confession cases, from
Brown v. Mississippi" in 1936 through Massiah to Miranda, followed
this pattern. The introduction of a lawyer into the lineup process to
protect the defendant from inaccurate identifications may provide
the foundation for a new look at the scope of the self-incrimination
privilege.
88. See Thompson v. Louisville, 862 U.S. 199 (1960).
39. For one approach to the notion of a due process law of evidence, see Richardson,
Rochin and Breithaupt in Context, 14 VAIn. L. REv. 879 (1961): "[Tjhe proposition here
advanced is that if the particular process ...is so unreliable as to have little or no
probative value, the admission on behalf of the state of the results thereof in a criminal
prosecution would violate due process."
At the same time, there is much to be said against a due process approach to
reliability. Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Wade complained that the majority opinion
made "the specific constitutional right of counsel dependent on judges' vague and
transitory notions of fairness . 8..." 388 U.S. at 247. It might be added that in addition
to the implied lack of predictability under the Court's approach, there is an economic
argument against use of the due process clause to make nice evidentiary distinctions:
if the admission of evidence is to be keyed to its reliability, every evidentlary ruling by
a trial court, state or federal, becomes the stuff of constitutional litigation. Thus, federal
district courts might become no more than third-level appellate courts in evidentlary
due process cases. While such a result would impose heavier docket loads, there is no
reason to believe that federal courts are better able to consider relative reliability than
are the highest courts of the several states; accordingly, the marginal utility of a due
process approach may be minimal.
40. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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Lawyers and Lineups
Although a majority of the justices found no violation of the self-
incrimination privilege in the lineup cum voice identification test in
Wade, the factionalization of the Court suggests that it may have
wished to temporize on this issue as well as the question of just how
the problem of unreliable identifications can best be solved. Justice
Douglas adhered in his dissent to his position in Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia41 and would find any compulsory lineup violative of the
privilege.42 Mr. Justice Black, also clinging to his Schmerber dissent,4 3
argued that the voice-identification to which Wade was subjected vio-
lated his test, but voted to affirm Wade's conviction, since the defense,
and not the prosecution, had elicited the evidence of the prior
lineup.44 Mr. Justice Fortas, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Douglas, agreed with the majority that a mere lineup did not
violate the privilege, but dissented from its conclusion that Wade's
compelled utterances were also not privileged. For Fortas, the crucial
failing of the latter was that it required a "volitional act" by the
accused which was "within the historical perimeter of the privilege."45
Even Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority was careful to say only that
"it deserves emphasis that this case presents no question of the admis-
sibility in evidence of anything Wade said or did at the lineup which
implicates his privilege";40 his opinion suggests that the majority left
open the question whether lineup practices might violate even the
"testimonial" test of Schmerber.
Thus, even last June the Court was anything but unified in its
conception of the privilege. A "volitional act" gloss on the "testi-
monial" test is among the least radical possible modifications of the
Court's position.47 And even the "testimonial" test without explicit
41. 384 US. 757, 778 (1966).
42. 388 US. at 243.
43. 584 U.S. 757, 773 (1966).
44. 388 U.S. at 247. In addition, Mr. Justice Black dissented from the majority s disposi-
tion of the case-the remand for what he called a "tainted fruit" hearing--since he felt
that the majority had written a "novel rule of evidence" in derogation of the states' crim-
inal jurisdiction. Id. at 248-49. And in Stovall, he dissented from the Court's approval of
Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). To judge the issue of whether a given
procedure violated the due process clause, argued Mr. Justice Black, "is to make this Court
not a Constitution-interpreter, but a day-to-day Constitution-maker." Id. at 305. On the
other hand, he would have agreed with the Wade majority, had the state attempted to
introduce testimony concerning the lineup. Thus, while Mr. Justice Black does not wish
the Court to formulate evidentiary rules for the states, he is willing to exclude evidence
when it is arrived at in the absence of a particular safeguard of reliability--counsel.
45. Id. at 260.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Four justices--Black, Douglas, Fortas, and the Chief Justice-believed that
compelling a suspect to speak, even for purposes of voice identification, violates the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Mr. Justice Clark, who joined
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modification establishes anything but a well-defined pale around the
privilege.
The earlier discussion suggested that one consequence of a "case by
case" approach to the problem of reliability in lineup identifications
may be a sizable swell of cases. To the extent the Court is willing, if
not eager, to consider further the none too distinct lines it has drawn
around the self-incrimination privilege as well as to familiarize itself
with the subject of reliability breached in Wade, this consequence
may not be an unpleasant side effect, but a considered purpose of the
decision. The confession cases came to the Court for many years under
the due process clause. Increased familiarity with the factual permuta-
tions of that problem convinced the Court, at length, of a need to
expand the protection of the privilege and lay down explicit rules for
interrogations. The result may be similar-although, in all likelihood,
less dramatic-in the area of lineups.
in the majority view, has since left the Court. For a state case taking the minority's side,
see Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942). Contra, Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 9 A. 78 (1887).
It should be noted in passing that the "volitional act" concept is not new. It was
utilized by some Southern courts of an earlier era to prohibit an accused from being
made to stand up in court for identification. State v. Jacobs, 50 N.C. 259 (1858); Wells v.
State, 20 Ala. App. 240, 101 So. 624 (1924). The Alabama court has persisted, apparently
because its constitution's self-incrimination clause uses the words "give evidence against
himself," rather than the more common "testify." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; see Smth v.
State, 247 Ala. 354, 24 So. 2d 546 (1946); F. INBAU, S-F-INCR1MINATioN 27-28 (1950).
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